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Torts: The Fault-Free Plaintiff and the Governmental
Tortfeasor: Several Liability in Oklahoma under
Fuller v. Odom.
Introduction
The common law doctrines of joint and several liability and sovereign im-
munity, long used by Oklahoma courts to determine the relative culpability
of joint tortfeasors and the liability of government tortfeasors, have lately
been affected by statutory revision and by judicial statutory interpretation.
The Oklahoma Supreme Court's decision iri Fuller v. Odom' impacts on both
of these important common law doctrines. This note will examine the impact
of Fuller on joint and several liability and sovereign immunity in Oklahoma.
In Oklahoma, recent statutory changes outlined within the Governmental
Tort Claims Act' have, in effect, created a new class of tortfeasor, the govern-
mental tortfeasor.3 The liability of the government is now determined solely
by the statute, exclusive of prior common law rules.4 Because the Govern-
mental Tort Claims Act provides for several liability in tort for governmental
entities, the statute has led to an Oklahoma Supreme Court decision in Fuller
v. Odom which is markedly different from that which would have been
rendered under prior case law.'
Sovereign Immunity in Oklahoma
The concept of governmental immunity from suit derives from centuries-
old English common law. 6 Its historical basis, "the King can do no wrong,"'
has today become more of a governmental policy of preventing depletion of
public funds via payment of legal judgments than a belief in monarchical
inviolability.8
The framers of the United States Constitution provided for preclusion from
suits against states in the eleventh amendment.9 The amendment states that
"[t]he judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend
to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the
United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or subjects of any
Foreign State."' 0 In Oklahoma, the doctrine of sovereign immunity had been
1. 741 P.2d 449 (Okla. 1987).
2. 51 OKLA. STAT. §§ 151-71 (1981 & Supp. 1984).
3. Fuller, 741 P.2d at 451 n.6.
4. Id. at 450.
5, Id. at 452.
6. 72 Am. Juy. 2D States, Territories and Dependencies § 99 (1974).
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. U.S, CONsT, amend. XI.
10. Id.
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embraced judicially" until the 1983 Oklahoma Supreme Court's decision in
Vanderpool v. State.2 In Vanderpool, the court abolished the concept of
governmental immunity in Oklahoma.
13
The Vanderpool decision abrogated the judicially created doctrine of govern-
mental immunity.' 4 As a result, Oklahoma joined the courts and legislatures
of a majority of states which had either substantially limited the doctrine of
sovereign immunity, or done away with it altogether.' However, the Oklahoma
Supreme Court recognized the legislature's power to readopt the doctrine
statutorily,'6 which the legislature did in 1984.17
Prior to Vanderpool, the Oklahoma Supreme Court had recognized an ex-
ception to absolute state immunity from suit by drawing a distinction between
state functions which were "proprietary," and thus subject to liability," and
those which were "governmental," and thus immune from liability." The
distinction was first recognized in municipal tort liability cases. 2" It was later
extended to counties, the state and state agencies.2 ' Thus, the judicial deter-
mination of whether activities were "proprietary" or "governmental" was
necessary to the maintenance of a suit against a governmental entity.22
This distinction in Oklahoma courts was eroded when the Oklahoma Legisla-
ture enacted the Governmental Tort Liability Act in 1965 (the "1965 Act").
2 3
The 1965 Act stated that a municipality, whether acting in a proprietary or
governmental capacity, could be held liable for the torts of its employees.24
An Oklahoma Supreme Court ruling, however, held that the 1965 Act was
inapplicable to municipal proprietary functions because the Act's title did not
specifically "refer to proprietary functions. ' 2 A 1968 legislative amendment
to the 1965 Act excluded a municipality's proprietary activities from tort liabili-
11. State ex rel. Williamson v. Superior Court, 323 P.2d 979 (Okla. 1958); Duncan v. State
Highway Comm'n, 311 P.2d 203 (Okla. 1957); Mountcastle v. State, 193 Okla. 506, 145 P.2d
392 (1943).
12. 672 P.2d 1153 (Okla. 1983).
13. Vanderpool, 672 P.2d at 1156. See also, Dillsaver, An Overview of the Governmental
Tort Claims Act, 56 OKLA. B.J. 2938 (1985).
14. Id.
15. Vanderpool, 672 P.2d at 1156.
16. Fuller, 741 P.2d at 451.
17. 51 OKLA. STAT. § 152.1 (Supp. 1986).
18. City of Oklahoma City v. Hill, 6 Okla. 114, 50 P. 242 (1897).
19. Note, Torts: Sovereign Immunity: The Changing Doctrine of the Immunity of the State
in Tort in Oklahoma, 25 OKiA. L. REv. 592 (1972).
20. Comment, Sovereign Immunity For Tort Actions in Oklahoma: The Governmental Tort
Claims Act, 20 TULSA L.J. 561, 568 (1985).
21. Id.
22. White v. City of Lawton, 373 P.2d 25 (Okla. 1961); Souligny v. Ponca City, 272 P.2d
413 (Okla. 1954); Oklahoma City v. Baldwin, 113 Okla. 289, 272 P. 453 (1928).
23. Note, Municipal Corporations: Municipal Immunity-A Changing Doctrine in Oklahoma,
32 OKLA. L. REv. 890 (1979).





ty.26 Therefore, the determination of whether activities were "proprietary"
or "governmental" was still important, even under the 1965 Act.
In 1977, the legislature partially repealed the 1965 Act, including its title,
and recodified remaining sections by enacting the Municipal Code.27 The por-
tions of the Municipal Code relating to municipal immunity, however, were
in part repealed and recodified with the passage in 1978 of the Political Sub-
division Tort Claims Act (the "1978 Act").2 8 The 1978 Act completely re-
jected "the governmental proprietary test by specifically providing that it ap-
plies to both governmental and proprietary functions." 29
In response to the Oklahoma Supreme Court's abolition of judicially created
sovereign immunity in its 1983 Vanderpool decision, 30 the legislature readopted
the doctrine in 1984 under its present name, the Governmental Tort Claims
Act (the "Act"). 3 ' This Act was referred to as the Political Subdivision Tort
Claims Act by the Oklahoma Supreme Court in Fuller.32 The Act today is
the exclusive means by which one may bring an action against the state or
a political subdivision for its torts or those of their employees.
33
The legislature, under the Act, expressly adopted the doctrine of sovereign
immunity for "[tihe state, its political subdivisions, and all of their employees
acting within the scope of their employment, whether performing governmental
or proprietary functions . . . -34 The drafters of the Act left little doubt,
by the language of section 152.1(B), of their intent that the Act be construed
as a broad embrace of governmental sovereign immunity with narrow
provisions for waiver. The statute states in part, "The state, only to the ex-
tent and in the manner provided in this act, waives its immunity and that
of its political subdivisions. In so waiving immunity, it is not the intent of
the state to waive any rights under the Eleventh Amendment to the United
States Constitution.
35
Whether the Act was applicable to the facts of Fuller was never contested
by the litigants. 36 The case below was litigated on a straight negligence cause
of action.3 7 The only issue remaining open for determination was whether




27. 11 OKLA. STAT. (1971 & Supp. 1977).
28. See Note, infra note 23, at 893 n.27.
29. Id. at 893.
30. See Comment, supra note 20, at 574.
31. 51 OKLA. STAT. § 151 (1981 & Supp. 1986) (historical note following text of statute).
32. Fuller, 741 P.2d at 450.
33. 51 OiaA. STAT. § 153 (Supp. 1986).
34. Id. at 152.1A.
35. Id.
36. Brief in Support of Defendant City of Tulsa's Motion to Consolidate at 3, Fuller v.
Odom, 741 P.2d 449 (Okla. 1987) (no reply by plaintiff to reference in motion to section 154E).
37. Petition at 2; Answer of Defendant City of Tulsa at p. 2-3, Fuller v. Odom, 741 P.2d
449 (Okla. 1987).
38. Fuller, 741 P.2d at 450.
1989]
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Joint and Several Liability in Oklahoma
The history of joint and several tort liability in Oklahoma is similar to
the development of the doctrine elsewhere.39 At first, a joint tortfeasor was
one who united in an act with another, 0 or acted in concert with another,
'
4
to damage an innocent person. Under common law, joint tortfeasors were
held jointly and severally liable,'42 meaning the innocent plaintiff could sue
one or more of the defendants separately, or all of them together.43 The rationale
for the rule was that each joint wrongdoer who pursued a common plan or
design to commit a tortious act was equally culpable in the eyes of the law.
4
Because each participant who united with another in a wrongful act was
deemed morally blameworthy to an equal degree,'4 Oklahoma courts allowed
recovery of the entire amount of damages from any single joint tortfeasor,4 1
so that an injured plaintiff might have a better opportunity for complete com-
pensation."1
The requirement of concerted action in a tortious activity was eventually
relaxed in Oklahoma, making individuals responsible for concurring but in-
dependent acts, which produced a single injury, liable as joint tortfeasors. 48
This development mirrored the trend elsewhere in the country.' 9 Because of
semantical difficulties in defining these tortious actors as "joint tortfeasors,"
they are more accurately referred to as "concurrent tortfeasors." The term
"joint tortfeasor" connotes action in concert, or action taken pursuant to
a joint interest, and such requirements are immaterial in concurrent
negligence.10
The Oklahoma Constitution, however, provides tortfeasors with the defense
of contributory negligence."1 Prior to 1973, contributory negligence operated
as a complete bar to any recovery by a plaintiff in a negligence action." In
1973, the Oklahoma Legislature adopted the state's first comparative negligence
statute.1
3
39. W. PROSSER, PROSSER ON TORTS § 46 (5th ed. 1984).
40. Preston v. Lewis, 50 Okla. 754, 151 P. 485 (1915).
41. W. PROSSER, PROSSER ON TORTS § 46 (5th ed. 1984).
42. Cain v. Quannah Light & Ice Co., 131 Okla. 25, 267 P. 641 (1928); Selby v. Lindstrom,
59 Okla. 227, 158 P. 1127 (1916).
43. BLACK'S LAW DIcTioNARY 433 (5th ed. 1983).
44. See W. PROSSER, supra note 39.
45. Id.
46. Adams v. Stanolind Oil & Gas Co., 187 Okla. 478, 103 P.2d 526 (1940); Town of Sentinel
v. Boggs, 177 Okla. 623, 61 P.2d 654 (1936); Prairie Oil & Gas Co. v. Laskey, 173 Okla. 48,
46 P.2d 484 (1935).
47. Boyles v. Oklahoma Natural Gas Co., 619 P.2d 613 (Okla. 1980).
48. Cities Service Oil Co. v. Merritt, 332 P.2d 677 (Okla. 1958); Harper-Turner Oil Co. v.
Bridge, 311 P.2d 947 (Okla. 1957).
49. See W. PROSSER, supra note 39.
50. 57 Am. JuR. 2D Negligence § 186 (1971).
51. OKLA. CoNsT. art. XXIII, § 6.
52. Hopson v. Triplett, 380 F. Supp. 1169 (E.D. Okla. 1974); Rader v. Fleming, 429 P.2d
750 (Okla. 1967); Barbe v. Barbe, 378 P.2d 314 (Okla. 1962).
53. Note, Comparative Negligence: The Role of the Absent Tortfeasor in Oklahoma, 34 OLA.




In 1978, the Oklahoma Supreme Court addressed the issue in Laubach v.
Morgan of whether a plaintiff's contributory negligence should be compared
to that of each individual tortfeasor, or to the negligence of all tortfeasors
aggregated.14 After comparing the competing rationales of the comparative
negligence statutes with decisions in other states, the court declared the com-
parative negligence statutes incomplete in scope and detail with regard to multi-
ple parties." Therefore, the court adopted the rule that a plaintiff's negligence
should be compared to the combined negligence of all defendants. 6
The Laubach court also held that multiple tortfeasors should be severally
liable in cases where the plaintiff was contributorily negligent. It also held
that defendants would only be liable for the percentage of negligence attributed
to them.1 In Laubach, the court chose not to abrogate the existing rule against
contribution between tortfeasors, one choice the court identified as a possible
solution to the problem of determining how to apportion damages among
multiple parties."8 Instead, the court made a prospective mandate that juries
would be responsible for apportioning the percentages of negligence between
joint tortfeasors. Each joint tortfeasor would be liable for that percentage
of the total damages assigned by the jury. Juries previously had been called
upon to determine the percentage of responsibility between a single plaintiff
and defendant." Therefore, a jury also should be capable of determining the
percentage of responsibility among defendants. The court rationalized its choice
as the one most compatible with existing comparative negligence statutes and
common law. 60 Neither state law nor case law allowed contribution among
joint tortfeasors at the time the Laubach decision was reached. 61 After
Laubach, joint and several liability would apply to a plaintiff's contributory
negligence, only if a jury was unable to apportion damages.62
Amended to its present form in 1979,63 the comparative negligence statute
now allows for recovery by a plaintiff whose own negligence amounts to as
much as fifty percent when compared to the combined negligence of all negli-
gent actors. The statute provides that "[w]here such contributory negligence
is shown on the part of the person injured, damaged or killed, the amount
of recovery shall be diminished in proportion to such person's contributory
negligence. ' 64 Oklahoma is now one of forty-five states which has recognized
some form of comparative negligence, either judicially or legislatively. 6
54. Laubach v. Morgan, 588 P.2d 1071 (Okla. 1978).
55. Id. at 1073.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 1074.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 1075.
61. Roberts, Contribution Among Joint Tortfeasors-Oklahoma Style, 50 OKLA. B. J. 2193
(1979).
62. Laubach, 588 P.2d at 1074.
63. 23 OKLA. STAT. §§ 13, 14 (1981).
64. Id. at 14.
65. W. PROSSER, PROSSER ON TORTS § 67 (5th ed. 1984) (Alabama, Maryland, North Carolina,
Tennessee and Virginia are the five remaining states).
1989]
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Since the enactment of the state's comparative negligence statute, the
Oklahoma Supreme Court has been called upon to apply the statute to cases
involving either multiple defendants and a contributorily negligent plaintiff,
6
or multiple defendants sued by a fault-free plaintiff. 67 Under these decisions,
contributory negligence on the part of plaintiffs will not bar their recovery,
provided these plaintiffs' portions of negligence are determined to be not more
than fifty percent. 68 However, such plaintiffs' damage awards will be reduced
proportionally to the percentage of negligence attributable to them.69 The plain-
tiffs' percentage of contributory negligence is calculated by a comparison to
the aggregate negligence of all defendants. 0 Finally, because there is no way
to compare single or multiple defendants' negligence where a plaintiff is fault
free, the statutory comparative negligence provisions are inapplicable. In such




Prior to Fuller72 the Oklahoma courts had never addressed the issue of
a statutory mandate of several liability where a governmental cotortfeasor
was held negligent toward a fault-free plaintiff. The decision-making process
of the Fuller court was, therefore, one of both statutory construction and
application.
73
In Fuller, Judy Fuller and her husband, Kenneth Boyce, filed separate suits
against the City of Tulsa and one of its police officers for personal injuries
received in an automobile accident. The accident involved a city police car
driven by Officer Steven Odom, and a car driven by Boyce in which Fuller
was a passenger. The court consolidated the two cases based on a motion
by the City of Tulsa 74 and dismissed Officer Odom from the suit."
In a jury trial that concluded on January 8, 1986, the jury found the City
of Tulsa fifty-one percent negligent and Boyce forty-nine percent negligent,
and it awarded damages of $10,000 to Boyce and $35,000 to Fuller. 76 The
trial judge entered judgment for Boyce in the reduced amount of $5,100, pur-
suant to the provisions of the Act77 which required reduction of an award
66. Laubach, 588 P.2d at 1074 (holding that each codefendant is severally liable only for
the proportion of damages attributable to him).
67. Anderson v. O'Donoghue, 677 P.2d 648 (Okla. 1983) (tort-feasors jointly and severally
liable); Boyles v. Oklahoma Natural Gas Co., 619 P.2d 613 (Okla. 1980).
68. OKLA. CONST. art. XXIII, § 6; 23 OKLA. STAT. § 13 (1981).
69. Id. at 14 (1987).
70. 23 OKLA. STAT. § 13 (1981).
71. Boyles, 619 P.2d at 613.
72. Fuller, 741 P.2d at 451.
73. Id.
74. Motion to Consolidate at 1, 2, Fuller v. Odom, 741 P.2d 449 (Okla. 1987).
75. Brief of Appellant at 1, Fuller v. Odom, 741 P.2d 449 (Okla. 1987).
76. Fuller, 741 P.2d at 450.
77. 51 OKLA. STAT. §§ 151-71 (1981 & Supp. 1986).
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to a contributorily negligent plaintiff by the percentage of negligence attributed
to the plaintiff.
78
Under Oklahoma common law prior to the Act, joint tortfeasors found
to have harmed a fault-free plaintiff were all jointly and severally liable.
79
The trial judge, apparently influenced by the fact that Fuller was a fault-free
plaintiff, did not reduce the award to her. The City of Tulsa appealed the
entry of judgment.8" The City contended that the "act is exclusive and governs
the means by which Fuller can recover." 8' The City of Tulsa further argued
that a political subdivision's liability under the Act is several from that of
any other person or entity.82 Therefore, Fuller's award also should have been
reduced to fifty-one percent of the full award: the amount of negligence cor-
responding to the city's percentage of negligence.
8 3
On appeal, Fuller asserted that the Act was inapplicable where a fault-free
plaintiff is injured by a governmental entity.84 Prior to Fuller, the Oklahoma
Supreme Court had not considered whether a political subdivision's negligence
liability is several from that of any other entity, even that of a fault-free
plaintiff.
Justice Kauger, writing for a unanimous court, indicated that the intention
of the court was to decide Fuller consonantly, 5 both with its 1983 landmark
decision in Vanderpool v. State,86 in which it renounced sovereign immunity
in Oklahoma, and with the legislature's 1984 readoption of the doctrine in
the Governmental Tort Claims Act.8 7 The court noted its Vanderpool decision
did not preclude a legislative enactment embracing sovereign immunity.
88
In Oklahoma, actions against negligent tortfeasors normally proceed accord-
ing to the state's comparative negligence statutes.8 9 However, courts have held
those provisions inapplicable where a plaintiff is determined to be faultless.
98
Where a fault-free plaintiff successfully brings suit against multiple tortfeasors,
comparative negligence does not apply and each tortfeasor is jointly and
severally liable for all harm. 9' The rationale for the rule is that an innocent
plaintiff should be completely compensated for the injury incurred and that
each of the wrongdoers should bear the burden of dividing the fault, not the
innocent plaintiff. 92
78. Id. at 154F.
79. Boyles v. Oklahoma Natural Gas, 619 P.2d 613 (Okla. 1980).
80. Fuller, 741 P.2d at 451.
81. Brief of Appellant at 4, Fuller v. Odom, 741 P.2d 449 (Okla. 1987).
82. 51 OKLA. STAT. § 154F (Supp. 1986).
83. Id.
84. Brief of Appellee at 1, Fuller v. Odom, 741 P.2d 449 (Okla. 1987).
85. Fuller, 741 P.2d at 451.
86. Vanderpool, 672 P.2d at 1153.
87. 51 OKLA. STAT. § 152.1 (Supp. 1986) (effective October 1, 1985).
88. Fuller, 741 P.2d at 451.
89. Id.




Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1989
OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW
In addition, because the court had previously held that any limitations within
the Act supercede general statutory law, 93 cases arising under the Act were
to be determined by the provisions of the Act alone, without resort to other
statutes." Thus, the Fuller court determined it would not base its decision
on a comparison between the Act and other state statutes. The court's deci-
sion was based on a comparison between the terms of the Act and the existing
common law regarding joint and several liability."1
The Fuller court was faced with a setting wherein one of the tortfeasors
belonged to a separate class for which a separate rule had previously been
devised.' 6 The separate class included governmental tortfeasors. 7 The rule
applicable to governmental tortfeasors derived exclusively from the Act. This
included section 170 of the Act which mandated reliance on the Act alone
to remedy the torts of a governmental entity.8 Under the provisions of the
Act, therefore, governmental tort liability would be several "from that of
any other person or entity" in proportion.to the government's percentage
of negligence." The statutory rule, however, conflicted with Oklahoma common
law providing for joint and several liability.
The rule of judicial statutory interpretation in Oklahoma has long been
that legislative intent should control judicial construction of a particular enact-
ment.' The primary method for ascertaining legislative intent is to give the
language of a statute its plain and obvious meaning.' 0 ' Further, courts should
not "read into a statute exceptions not made by the Legislature."' 2
Applying the "plain and obvious" meaning rule to the language of the Act,
the Fuller court held that the statute was unambiguous. 03 The court held that
because the Act contained no ambiguous language, judicial analysis of the
Legislature's statutory intent was unnecessary where legislative intent "is clearly
expressed."" 4
Because the language of the Act was clear, the court stated its construction
of the statute would not be to determine already clearly established legislative
93. Hamilton v. Vaden, 721 P.2d 412 (Okla. 1986); Graves v. Rose, 663 P.2d 733 (Okla. 1983).
94. Hamilton, 721 P.2d at 419 n.31; Graves, 663 P.2d at 735.
95. Fuller, 741 P.2d at 450.
96. Black v. Ball Janitorial Serv. Inc., 730 P.2d 510 (Okla. 1986).
97. Id.
98. Id. 51 OKaA. STAT. § 170 (1981) provides: "This act is exclusive and supersedes all home
rule charter provisions and special laws on the same subject heretofore, and all acts or parts
of acts in conflict herewith are repealed." See also 51 OKLA. STAT. § 153B (Supp. 1989) ("the
liability of the state or political subdivision under this act shall be exclusive and in place of
all other liability of the state, a political subdivision or employee at common law or otherwise").
99. 51 OKLA. STAT. § 154F (1981 & Supp. 1986).
100. Seventeen Hundred Peoria, Inc. v. City of Tulsa, 422 P.2d 840 (Okla. 1966); City of
Bristow v. Groom, 194 Okla. 384, 151 P.2d 936 (1944).
101. City of Bristow v. Groom, 194 Okla. 384, 151 P.2d 936 (1944).
102. Fuller, 741 P.2d at 454.
103. Id. at 454 n.23.
104. Id. at 452. See also 25 OKLA. STAT. § 29 (1981).
[Vol. 42
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intent."0 5 The court would only decide what remedy was available to Fuller
under the terms of the Act.' 6 Fuller challenged the court's interpretation.
10 7
In her appeal to the Oklahoma Supreme Court, Fuller contented that the
language of the statute was not sufficiently "clear and convincing" to abrogate
the rule "that a negligent defendant's liability is both joint and several in
situations involving negligence-free plaintiffs."'' 00 Fuller argued that the
legislature's intent when enacting the statute was merely to limit a political
subdivision's liability in cases of multiple negligent plaintiffs and defendants.
This, she argued, was to prevent political subdivisions from bearing the burden
of paying all the damages to a plaintiff under a "deep pocket" theory.'
This reasoning did not persuade the court."0 Because it had determined the
language of the Act to be clear and unambiguous,"' and applicable to all
plaintiffs," 2 the court was unable to accept Fuller's theory of statutory inter-
pretation.1"1 Therefore, the court's holding was based on established judicial
and legislative rules of statutory construction."' Fuller's trial court award was
reduced pursuant to the terms of the Act.
The Effect of Fuller v. Odom
The Fuller decision was judicial enforcement of legislative intent to alter
previous common law rules of the joint and several liability of governmental
entities."' The Fuller ruling does not overrule existing rules of joint and several
liability," 6 but expressly declares that "the common law rule of joint and
several liability continues in force outside the purview of the comparative
negligence statute.""' A reasonable conclusion can be drawn that the court
views the several liability section of the Act as an addition to the Oklahoma
comparative negligence statutes. That is, the Act is a comparative negligence
statute applicable in instances where a governmental entity is one of two or
more tortfeasors. As the court stated, the Act embodies a special rule for
a special class of tortfeasor."01
105. Fuller, 741 P.2d at 452.
106. Id.
107. Brief of Appellee at 3, Fuller v. Odom, 741 P.2d 449 (Okla. 1987).
108. Id. at 6.
109. Id.
110. Fuller, 741 P.2d at 454. The court stated, "[w]e agree that the common law rule of joint
and several liability continues in force outside the purview of the comparative negligence statute.
We cannot agree, however, that the same rule applies to litigation arising under the Political
Subdivision Tort Claims Act." Id.
111. Fuller, 741 P.2d at 452, 453.
112. Id. at 454.
113. Id.
114. Fuller, 741 P.2d at 454.
115. H.B. 1672, 41st Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (1988); H.B. 1605, 41st Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (1988).
116. Fuller, 741 P.2d at 452.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 451 n.6.
1989] NO TES
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Aside from being a case of first impression on the government liability ques-
tion, 9 the Fuller decision had the added peculiarity of negligence attributed
to a plaintiff's spouse.'2 ' There is no spousal immunity in tort in Oklahoma.12'
Though she did not, Fuller was free to proceed against her husband, who
was later held to be forty-nine percent negligent in causing the accident which
injured her.22 Under Oklahoma law, Fuller's husband would have been jointly
and severally liable to her had she obtained a judgment against him. 23
A more typical situation involving a governmental entity as a cotortfeasor
would be one in which the plaintiff includes a claim against the non-
governmental defendant. If the plaintiff is faultless, as Fuller was, then non-
governmental tortfeasors would be subjected to joint and several liability, 24
while the governmental entity would be severally liable only.2 5
One result of Fuller may be a re-examination by plaintiffs and their at-
torneys of the traditional "deep pockets" theory of suing multiple
tortfeasors-suing one or more defendants with the greatest ability to remit
in damages. Governmental entities may no longer be regarded as parties with
"deep pockets," particularly where their negligence is estimated to be minimal.
Because the government entity may not be viewed as a "deep pocket," plaintiff
strategy in similar situations in the future may be to name more defendants
in suits involving multiple tortfeasors, where one is a governmental entity.
The nongovernmental tortfeasors would be subject to joint and several liability,
making it possible for a plaintiff to seek complete satisfaction from any except
the governmental tortfeasor.
Another possible result of Fuller may be an increase in contribution suits.
This increase could easily occur if only one of many tortfeasors is sued and
that tortfeasor pays more than a pro rata share of damages. After Fuller,
an over-paying tortfeasor will likely seek contribution from a liable govern-
mental entity. Although at common law there was no right of noncontractual
contribution, 2 6 the right of contribution in tort has been permitted by statute
in Oklahoma since 1978.127
In a contribution action against a governmental entity, the first question
to be resolved will be whether such an action is authorized at all under the
language of the contribution statute. The statute states, "Where two or more
persons become jointly or severally liable in tort for the same injury to person
or property or for the same wrongful death, there is a right of contribution
among them .... ,,128
119. Fuller, 741 P.2d at 450.
120. Id. at 450.
121. White v. White, 618 P.2d 921 (Okla. 1980).
122. Fuller, 741 P.2d at 450.
123. See supra text accompanying notes 38-67.
124. Id.
125. Fuller, 741 P.2d at 450.
126. Laubach, 588 P.2d at 1074.
127. 12 OKLA. STAT. § 832 (Supp. 1978) (passed by the Legislature after the 1978 Laubach
decision).




The question will be whether the term "person" in the statute includes
governmental entities. The issue has not been decided in Oklahoma. However,
when such a case arises, the contribution plaintiff will likely ask a trial court
to construe the language of the contribution statute as including governmental
entities.
If a court in such a case is persuaded that the plain and obvious meaning
of "person" does not include governmental entities, then no right of contribu-
tion against governmental entities will be allowed. But, if the language of
the statute is deemed to be ambiguous or unclear, then a court will determine
the legislature's intent when it enacted the statute. How a court will respond
to each party's arguments if such a case should arise is difficult to predict.
The former choice is the one likely to be made and, if so, legislative amend-
ment of the contribution statute will be necessary if a right of contribution
against a governmental entity is to be allowed in Oklahoma.' 2 9
Because the Act effectively creates a special class, the governmental tort-
feasor, this special class will only be held liable for its proportion of fault.
An unlikely effect of the Fuller decision will be to hinder settlement negotia-
tions when governmental defendants estimate their negligence to be a low
percentage of a plaintiff's claim. To assume the representatives of a govern-
mental entity will take a "sue us, we're only slightly negligent and severally
liable" attitude, is not a sound assumption to make. The risk of a jury's
finding a higher percentage of governmental negligence than estimated is too
great to preclude sincere settlement negotiations. 30
In the Tulsa City Attorney's Office the Fuller decision has not significantly
affected its procedure of considering all facts and circumstances of each par-
ticular case. Where the City of Tulsa determines it might have some liability,
it will still enter into settlement negotiations.' 3 1 What the Fuller decision has
provided to the City of Tulsa is a valuable bargaining chip to be utilized during
settlement. It has not created a policy of nonsettlement.1
32
Conclusion
Most American jurisdictions utilizing some form of comparative negligence
have retained the doctrine of joint and several liability among tortfeasors. 33
Some states have expressly abolished joint and several liability.'
34
129. Because the Tort Claims Act and Fuller provide that such entities are severally liable
only for the percentage of damages attributable to them, it should be unnecessary for a govern-
mental entity to bring a contribution suit. Consequently, there should never be an overpayment
by a governmental entity of a damage award.
130. Telephone interview with Martha Rupp Carter, City of Tulsa Assistant City Attorney
(Aug. 11, 1988) (Ms. Carter was Tulsa's attorney in Fuller).
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. V. SCdwARTz, CoiPAIATm NEGLIGENCE 16.4 (2d ed. 1986).
134. Id.
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Oklahoma's comparative negligence statute is silent on the issue.
' Judicial
decisions have produced the rule that joint tortfeasors are jointly and severally
liable to a faultless plaintiffI'l but only severally liable to a negligent plaintiff. "I
However, where one alleged wrongdoer is a governmental entity, the Act
mandates several liability for the governmental tortfeasor, regardless of whether
the plaintiff has contributed to the plaintiff's own injury. 3 The Oklahoma
Supreme Court's decision in Fuller reiterated the statutory rule of several liabil-
ity for governmental tortfeasors in Oklahoma, even against fault-free plaintiffs.
Tim Rhodes
135. 23 OKLA. STAT. §§ 12-14 (1981).
136. Boyles v. Oklahoma Natural Gas Co., 619 P.2d 613 (Okla. 1980).
137. Laubach v. Morgan, 588 P.2d 1071 (Okla. 1978).
138. 51 OKLA. STAT. §§ 151-71 (1981'& Supp. 1986).
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